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WHAT MAKES POSSIBILITY POSSIBLE~ 
GEORGE P. ADAMS 
rs THE PARADOX of experience that it denotes both that which 
is present, literally had and possessed, denotably there, con-
fronting us, and also a domain of prophecy and potency, 
eventual, tendencies, and possibilities, holding the promise 
or threat of something more to come. Experience is saturated with 
such reference to that which transcends, at any given time or place, 
is then and there immediately present and directly verified. 
this not so, were experience restricted to an awareness of 
literally confronts us in present given fact, then expectancy, 
waiting, purposeful planning, attention, exploration and 
investigation, memory and remorse would be utterly nonempirical 
~.,.,.rr,,ric•." The tiger stalking his prey, the hound following a scent, 
astronomer scanning the heavens, the prospector searching for 
gold, of these and a thousand like transactions is the stuff of ex-
perience primarily comprised. 
To be sure, something in some sense immediately had and experi-
(mced, something here and now present, provides the pon sto, the 
anchor or spring board of every transaction and venture of experi-
.A.nd somewhere in every experience there might be dis-
·cerned the boundary between such immediately present data and 
more outlying, distant domain not here and now immediately 
possessed. The history of the problem of knowledge is the history 
wha-t reflective thought has made of this situation. Something is 
1ID.me:<1111tel} present in experience. I shall use the term "actual" to 
any such ingredient of experience. All experience contains 
actual. But no less idubitably does the world which is 
in and experienced contain that which transcends the actual, 
trans-actual or hyper-actual. We live and act and know across 
boundary, wherever it lies, between the immediate and the 
the given and the hoped or feared for, present data and 
,., .... , .. ,,..,, they suggest, imply, portend, and mean. 
[ 3] 
4 University of Ca.lifornia Piiblications in Philosophy 
I propose to approach the problem of the meaning and the 
status of possibility in the light of this pervasive aspect of experi-
ence. But before I come to the question of possibility, it will be 
useful if I formulate briefly certain propositions concerning this 
general aspect of experience. I shall do so summarily and without 
argument. 
1. We have no experience of an isolated actual. There is never in 
experience an awareness of a pure given and of nothing else be-
sides. There is no such thing as knowledge by acquaintance alone, 
that is, knowledge in which the content known completely coincides 
with something directly and immediately given. Putting it the 
other way around, what is actually given can never be known by 
itself in total isolation from everything not so given. This means 
the shipwreck of any theory of knowledge which 1,upposes that the 
world of things known can be constructed out of entities imme-
diately present in experience, given and actual. 
2. The simplest object of awareness is complex. Its complexity 
is twofold. It is a relational and not a relationless entity . .Also-
and this will prove more interesting for our present problem-the 
simplest object of experience presents itself not only as a some-
thing here and now, as a this, but also as having a nature or char-
acter, as a such. The most elementary or atomic entity of experi-
ence or awareness is a this-such. There is a fundamental distinction 
between its thisness and its suchness, between the that (or this) 
and the what. Its being this precludes its being another this or that. 
But its being of such and such a nature does not preclude identity 
with another similar nature; on the contrary, it implies at least the 
possibility of such identification. I perceive a particular green 
patch. Its being this green patch prevents it from being any other 
green patch. But its being a patch of a certain kind, of a certain 
shade of green, implies the possibility of other exemplifications of 
the same nature. Even if one agrees, as I do, with Stout and others 
in holding that the color of this green patch is a particular, yet it is 
a particular natiire and not a particular this which is here consid-
ered. And because it is of this nature or kind, no matter how par-
ticular it is, the thought of other possible occurrences of this 
particular shade of green is germane to and implicated in the 
awareness of this particular shade of green. Thus, the experience 
of the simplest and most elementary entity, so long as it is experi-
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t ced as having some nature, some what ( and I do not know how, n . 
.. the absence of any nature, anything could be experienced), 
the possibility of other occurrences of the same kind. That 
has a nature, and that this possibility exists, seem to me 
say one and the same thing. We are introduced to possibility in 
most elementary object of awareness and experience. 
3. What of the thisness, as distinguished from the suchness? 
the this is wholly actual, with no taint of possibility to 
its actuality. Even if it be admitted that to be or to have a 
is to have a potential spread beyond the actual occurrence, 
here and now this, to_other at least possible thises, isn't it the 
privilege ( or defect) of the this to exclude everything actual or 
possible beyond just this? I do not think so. The shadow or specter 
of possibility intrudes into the experi~nce of this no less than it 
does into the experience of siich. It does so in several ways. Let any 
this present itself so that one might say, "this at least exists." The 
word "exist," so Stout has reminded us, originally means to step 
out or forth, to come forth, to emerge. "This exists" means "this 
stands out from a background." A background makes possible the 
existence, the stepping forth of the this. Without such a back-
ground, no this. Moreover, the this is what is pointed to, indicated, 
demonstrated, and denoted. In pointing to this or that, I direct 
attention to it as an object of possible experience for you at the 
present time, or for me at some future time. Affixing names and 
symbols to this and that is to do more than barely indicate through 
pointing. It is at the very least, as Lewis has-so well shown, predic-
tive of other possible experience. To designate this thing as an 
apple is to say what further experiences would ensue if one did 
thus and thus. A series of hypothetical propositions is required to 
state and to justify the designation of any this. 
Experience, then, is never restricted to the actual. The actual, 
as experienced, is surrounded by the trans- or hyper-actual. 
Neither the future nor the past is actual as is the present. In 
listening to music, the only sounds and harmonies which are 
actual are the ones being heard .. These actual sounds constitute a 
living present, moving like the crest of a wave through the entire 
symphony from beginning to end. This is not to say that only the 
actual present exists or is real. I am quite sure that both past and 
future events are real and may in some measure be known. The 
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past is the background from which the actual present steps forth 
and exists; in being aware of any actual present, I am also aware 
of the nona.ctual but real past and future. With respect to future, 
predictable events, Eddington writes : 
I infer the existence in 1999 of a con:figuration of the sun, earth and moon 
which corresponds to a total eclipse. The shadow of the moon on Cornwall in 
1999 is already in the world of inference. It is not easy to see in what way it 
will gain in status when the year 1999 arrives and the eclipse is observed! 
Eddington can so state it only because he supposes-wrongly, as I 
think-that no physical state of affairs is ever directly experi-
enced or actual (in my terminology) . .A.ll physical objects and 
happenings are inferred; including those which are mistakenly 
said to be perceived now; they belong to the world of inference. 
If we abandon this assumption, as I think we mrist, then the eclipse 
observable in Cornwall in 1999, while in some sense it is real now, 
just as the battle of Hastings is a real event, will become actual 
only when and if there will be persons in Cornwall in 1999 to 
observe the eclipse. 
In situations such as this, we are confronted with the first major 
domain and meaning of the possible. The actual is contrasted to 
and surrounded by that which is other and more than the actual. 
This other and more than the actual is both the possible and the 
real. But although more and other than the actual, the possible 
and the real are continuous with the actual. In seeing a circular 
greenish patch in front of me and in naming it an apple, I am 
both positing a set of characters which are now real, continuous 
with, and linked to the shape actually seen, and asserting the 
possibility of experiences which I or you would have if we manipu-
lated the apple in specific ways. These possible experiences are like-
wise continuous with my present actual experience of greenish, 
circular shape. Because of such continuity between this type of the 
possible and actual experience, I shall designate this as the "con-
tinuous possible." This is merely an abbreviation for "any possible 
which is continuous with and an extension of any actual experi-
ence." There is, we shall see, another meaning and domain of the 
possible. There are possibles not thus continuous with present 
actual experience, but transcending, in a sense requiring careful 
1 Proa. Aristotelian Soc., Suppl., X, 168. 
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'aefinition, both the actual and the real. This second kind of possi-
bility I shall designate as "transcendent possibility." But I wish 
first to consider some aspects of the class of continuous possibles-
entities which stretch beyond the actual, yet are continuous with 
the actual. 
The possible which is conceived as a continuation and extension 
of the actual is the realm of possible experience. With respect to 
this realm and concept of possible experience, I shall make two 
comments. First, as I have already noted, what is actually experi-
enced may be contrasted with what is not, yet might be, under 
specifiable conditions, so experienced. Or, it may be contrasted with 
what is said to be real, as having a being independent of its being 
experienced. What is actually experienced may be thought of as a 
fragment of the wider realm of possible experience, or of a world 
with respect to which experience, actual or possible, is in a sense 
irrelevant. Anyway, since we do sometimes contrast the actually 
experienced with possible experience, and sometimes with the real, 
a question arises concerning the relation between what is said to 
be real and what is said to belong to the realm of possible experi-
ence. The center of the earth has never been actually experienced. 
When now one says that the center of the earth is solid and not 
gaseous, what does one mean~ For my own part, I am quite sure 
that I never mean merely that, if I were to dig a tunnel through 
the center of the earth and journey halfway through, I should then 
have actual experiences of the sort that I now have when I touch 
solid bodies. Whatever is for me at the present time a possible 
experience can become actual only at some future time. But when 
I assert that the center of the earth is solid, I intend to assert a 
present state of affairs and not a future one. Moreover, the state-
ment that if I or anyone else were to do something, I or the other 
person would have certain actual experiences, appears to me to be 
a statement about me or someone else rather than a statement about 
the center of the earth. 
There are two alternative ways of describing the relation between 
possible experience and the real, depending upon which one of these 
is taken to be the more fundamental. One may say: By the real I 
mean nothing whatever except the possibility of further experi-
ence. Or one may say: By the possibility of further experience I 
mean the present reality of that which transcends actual experi-
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ence in a manner different from that in which possible experience 
transcends actual experience. The first of these two descriptions 
can, I suppose, be called pragmatic. It is clearly set forth by Lewis. 
What does it signify [he asks] that there should be verifiably more to any 
object than is given in the single experience of iU It can mean nothing else 
than the possibility of other experiences, of a predictable sort, related to this 
experience in particular ways. Any other kind of "more" attached to the 
presentation would be unverifiable." 
The other way of describing the situation can be said to be real-
istic. For the pragmatist of the type just referred to, it is possible 
experience alone which extends and connects fragmentary bits of 
actual experience. For the realist, the realm of possible experience 
is not left hanging in the air; its possibility rests upon a reality 
continuous with the bits of reality disclosed by actual experience. 
I am not always sure to what extent this difference between a 
pragmatic and a realistic interpretation of experience is a verbal 
one, but I am inclined to think that it is more than verbal. For a 
pragmatist such as Lewis, the question, What makes any experi-
ence possible, What is it that ~onfers upon possible experience its 
status of possibility, would, I am sure, be ruled out as meaningless. 
Possible experience is the ultimate category. There is nothing 
more ultimate which makes it possible. This does not quite satisfy 
me. The possibility of experiencing solidity at the center of the 
earth results from a state of affairs to which the term "possibility" 
is quite inappropriate. The solid center of the earth is more than a 
possibility. It is a reality continuous with the reality of the surface 
of the earth which is actually experienced. The fragmentary bits 
and perspectives of nature which manage to filter through the 
channels of our sense experience and thus become actual for us 
need to be woven together, extended, and supplemented. The non-
actual filling of nature is continuous with the actualized portions-
continuous in kind, in space-time, and in the modality of its being. 
I do not know how piecemeal and scattered actualities can be ce-
mented together to form a continuous order by entities which have 
merely the status of possibility. 
That the possibility of possible experience rests upon a reality 
continuous with the actual and not itself describable merely in 
terms of possibility is indicated by a second consideration. The 
2 C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 72. 
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between the actual and the continuous possible-possi-
ble experience continuous with actual experience-is epistemic. 
What is actual and what is possible depends upon us, upon the 
position we chance to occupy, the direction of our attention, our 
powers of observation, and the like. The fireplace in front of me is 
now actually experienced. While I am experiencing it, the book-
shelves behind me are objects of possible experience . .All I need 
do to transform them into objects actually experienced is to turn 
around. Now it is the fireplace which is a possible experience. It 
has ceased to be actually experienced. Which of these two is to be 
actual and which possible depends wholly upon me, it being under-
stood that both of them belong to one continuous, real world, inde-
pendent of and indifferent to the direction of my gaze. To say 
that the boundary between the actual and the possible is epistemic 
is thus to think of both regions as belonging to the real, and the 
boundary line as dependent upon the observer. The continuous 
possible is the extended and supplemented actual, the actual 
expanded into and cont1nuous with the real. 
Are there principles of a different type, possibilities which are 
not continuous with the presented actual, different in nature and 
status from, say, the center of the earth as an object of possible 
experience 1 Are there possibilities the distinction of which from 
either the actual or the real is not epistemic but constitutive 1 Do 
possibilities as such await our discovery, do they exist in reriim 
natiira? l believe that there are such possibles, and the remainder 
of my discussion will be devoted to them. In order to distinguish 
them from continuous possibles, I propose to call them transcend-
ent possibles. In so designating them, however, I would caution the 
reader not to conclnde at once that I am to invoke a separate realm 
of subsistence and to populate that world with entities for which 
there is no place in the world of existing nature. I may say that 
my views of the nature and significance of possibles other than the 
extended actual are the outcome of an attempt to avoid the Scylla 
of such a realm of subsistence transcending all that exists, and the 
Charybdis of a view which finds nowhere a legitimate place for 
objective possibilities. I want objective and constitutive possi-
bilities, and I do not want subsistent dualism. Of course, what I or 
anyone else merely happens to want and to like has nothing to do 
with the validity of theories, but I may be pardoned for so stating 
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the matter in order to give some indication of the general drift of 
my discussion. 
A transition to a kind of possibility different from the continuous 
possible is indicated by an aspect of the realm of possible experi-
ence. All the objects of possible experience are more than possible. 
They are extensions of the actual. But there are possible verifica-
tions of the real, the extended actual, which are not and never 
will be real. The taste of poisonous mushrooms, I hope never to 
verify. If men are judicious in picking mushrooms, the taste will 
never be verified. The taste itself is a possible actual. (To defend 
this statement would require a discussion of the status of second-
ary qualities which I must here forego.) The term "possible experi-
ence" is ambiguous. It may mean either the object of a possible 
experience, or it may mean the possibility of verifying, of actualiz-
ing such an object in or through experience. 
There is an indefinitely vast realm of possible verifications, of 
possible experiences, which may never become actual verifications; 
they always remain transcendent to actual experience. Royce, in 
the discussion of his third conception of Being, laid stress upon 
this situation. 
There are countless possible experiences which you never test .... The prices 
and credits of the commercial world involve far more numerous types of valid 
possible experience than any prudent merchant cares to test; for if these 
facts are valid as they are conceived, their very Being includes possibilities 
of unwise investment and bankruptcy, which the prudent business man recog-
nizes only to avoid. In fact, since our whole voluntary life is selective, we all 
the time recognize possibilities of experience only to shun the testing of them.' 
Now the possibilities thus recognized by us-only to shun their 
testing and verification-are not the objects to which these possi-
bilities make reference. They are possible alternative ways of 
behavior between which we make a choice. We now have, in a 
rejected alternative, a possible which is not an extended actual, 
nor continuous with the actual, but only a possibility. It has a 
status quite different from that of the center of the earth, or of the 
wall behind my back. These objects of possible experience are 
always more than mere possibilities. They are, if not actual, at 
least real. There are countless testings and verifications of such 
objects, which always remain possibilities and never become any-
' Royce, World and Individual, I, 258. 
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more. Some of these possibilities of verification also become 
actual. I mean by a transcendent possibility one which always 
remains just a possibility. Continuous possibilities are the real, 
more than possible, objects of possible verification. We have 
now to consider more in detail transcendent possibilities. 
_An objective realm of transcendent possibilities does, prim.a 
facie, confront us. In both practical and theoretical intercourse 
with our world we are constrained to take account of objective 
possibilities just as we are with actualities and the reals which are 
continuous with them. Let us survey some of the inhabitants of 
the domain of objective possibilities. I would direct attention to 
three kinds of possibility-the alternative, the capacity, and the 
tendency. 
We are confronted by alternatives whenever we are in a prob-
lematic situation. Problematic situations are either practical or 
theoretical. A practical problematic situation is one in which the 
problem takes on the form of What is to be done·~ Qiiid facien-
diim? When I wish to use my car and can't start it, I am in a 
problematic situation. There are alternative modes of procedure. 
I can experiment in a variety of ways with the car, or I can 
abandon the car, ask to borrow my neighbor's car, or call a taxi, or 
walk, or give up going altogether. Possible, alternative modes of 
behavior confront me and, no matter what I do, I make a choice. 
Ethical problems, in which there are conflicts of interests and 
desires, of loyalties and duties, consist of the presence in my world 
of competing, alternative determinations of conduct and interest. 
My decision decrees which of these possibilities shall become actual. 
But, prior to my decision, I am aware of and possess a knowledge 
of the relevant possible alternatives. There is, I may note in pass-
ing, no adequate provision for this prior knowledge of possibilities 
in an instrumental theory of mind and of knowledge. For a natural-
istic, biological theory of mind, the function which mind performs 
is pragmatic and operational. It exists in order to effect recon-
structions in experience, to manipulate, contrive, and control. In-
telligence arises under the stress of complex, problematic situations 
for which habit and routine are inadequate. Intelligence is said to 
be practical, and supposedly it is the vice of traditional, classical 
philosophy to conceive of the mind and of knowledge as a contem-
plative spectator. I would point out that the mind would be wholly 
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helpless to resolve or reconstruct a problematic situation unless it 
first had just such a contemplative, spectator knowledge of objec-
tive possible alternatives. Before we can reconstruct our economic 
order intelligently we need to know, in the traditional sense of 
contemplative presentation, what the objective possibilities really 
are. Without such contemplative knowledge, mind could not per-
form its equally important function of guiding practice. 
In theoretical experience we are likewise confronted with prob-
lematic situations, containing objective, alternative possibilities. 
A theoretical problematic situation is one in which there are com-
peting possible alternative explMations and interpretations of 
given fact. These possible explanations are hypotheses. There are 
two differences between practical and theoretical problematic 
situations. Each of several alternative scientific or theoretical 
hypotheses can be tested in turn, and the most adequate hypothesis 
selected. But, in every practical choice among alternative possible 
actions, the decision to do this rather than that precludes the actual 
testing, in that unique situation, of any alternative mode of be-
havior. Shall I boil or scramble these eggs? Either is possible, but 
I cannot test both possibilities in any single practical situation. If 
I want to know whether a number is prime or not, I can test each of 
these two alternative possibilities. 
In the second place, theoretical questions appear to differ from 
practical questions primarily in the method of their resolution, in 
the source of the decision decreeing which possible alternative is 
to be chosen. It is not we who make the decision, but the evidence 
and the facts. "Is this a dagger which I see before me f' To put this 
question is to be confronted by at least two alternatives each of 
which, prior to a decision, is possible. Either it is a dagger or it is 
not. Whether it is or is not depends on how this thing behaves when 
I manipulate it. The alternative possibilities relevant to a theoret-
ical question need not be explicitly formulated. How many quail 
are there at this moment in my garden f I cannot see Md therefore 
cannot count them. 'The alternative possibilities are but vaguely 
defined. There may be none, or one or two or three--any number 
up to a vague limit. I am quite certain that there are not a million. 
Alternative possibilities are not restricted with respect to their 
temporal reference. We discover alternative possibilities in the 
past as well as in the present and future. Otherwise, the conditional 
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:Perfect tense would be inexplicable and meaningless. The chess 
xno-ves which I might have made and the one which I now see that 
l ought to have made instead of the one that I actually made, are 
;1ternative possibles relevant to the past. Renouvier wrote a 
]J.ypothetical history of Europe "not as it was but as it might have 
been" if the Christians had remained an Eastern sect and had not 
obtained political mastery of the West. And Gibbon, in a famous 
passage, recounts the possible consequences which might have 
8,ttended a Saracen victory at the Battle of Tours. "Perhaps the 
•interpretation of the Koran would now be taught in the schools 
of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised 
people the sanctity •and truth of the revelation of Mahomet." An 
economic depression which might have been worse and more severe 
than the actual depression in which we now find ourselves is an 
alternative possibility relevant to a present state of affairs. The 
possible chess moves which I may make when I next play are 
•··• objective possibilities relevant to the immediate future. Possibili-
\:ties relevant to the past and the present always remain transcend-
••·· ent possibilities, whereas some possibilities relevant to the future 
may become actual. · 
.A. second type of transcendent possibility is indicated by the 
capacities in terms of which we describe thin,gs. Cotton is in:fl.am-
mable, sugar is soluble, dogs are teachable, and so forth. Adjectives 
like these, formed by the suffix "ble" denote the capability or 
possibility of exhibiting certain characteristics under certain 
general, specifiable conditions. This lump of sugar is soluble 
though it may never be actually dissolved. Its solubility is just as 
objective a character of the sugar as its shape, size, and specific 
gravity. Locke put his finger on such objective possibilities when 
he declared that "powers form a great part of our complex ideas 
of substances." The description of things in terms of their possi-
bilities, their capacities, does explicitly the very thing which, as 
we saw above, is implied by the nature or suchness of anything, 
even by the apparently simple, atomic qualities such as this partic-
ular shade of green. 'To have such and such a nature or cha:i;-acter-
istic is to be capable of other equally particular possible exemplifi-
cations. Capacities denote this spread beyond the actual in a more 
explicit manner than do simple natures and atomic qualities . 
.A. tendency is another kind of possibility, prima facie objective. 
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A tendency is distinguished from a capacity-not sharply-in that 
a capacity of anything depends for its actualization upon the 
positive presence of other things and outlying conditions, whereas . 
a tendency does not. Sugar is soluble. Whether any bit of sugar 
will be actually dissolved depends upon its being immersed in a 
liquid. There is no tendency toward solution in the sugar itself. 
On the contrary, a coiled spring tends to unwind. For the tend-
ency to be realized and made actual, it is only required that it be 
let alone. What things and structures do really have tendencies, 
so that a negative policy of laissez faire is all that is needed to in-
sure their fruition, is another question. I suggest in passing that 
the modern social and economic theory of laissez faire may be in 
grievous error precisely because of an uncritical ascription (in 
Aristotelian and Scholastic fashion) of tendencies to the ingredi-
ents of social processes. The history of science is, in large measure, 
the substitution of relational capacities for inherent tendencies. 
Alternatives, capacities, and tendencies by no means exhaust 
the universe of possibilities. There is a familiar passage in Hume's 
Enquiry which indicates how vast and apparently inexhaustible 
that universe is. Hume is portraying what he takes to be a false and 
unwarranted view of the power and scope of thought. 
Nothing [he says] seems more unbounded than the thought of man, which 
not only escapes all human power and authority, but is not even restrained 
within the limits of nature and reality. While the body is confined to one 
planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty, the thought can in an 
instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe. What never 
was seen or heard of may yet be conceived; nor is anything beyond the power 
of thought, except what implies an absolute contradiction.• 
This passage is cited to bring before us the apparent correlation 
between the world or worlds of the possible, infinitely wealthier 
than the world of reality, and the function of thought as distinct 
from sense experience. A creature endowed with sensory aware-
ness alone, were this possible, would have no apprehension of any 
possibilities. Its world would be limited to the present actual. There 
would be for such a creature no alternatives, capacities, tendencies, 
no "might have beens," fictions, nor supposals. The question con-
cerning the nature and status of possibles is the question concern-
ing the nature and status of objects of thought, and accordingly 
4 Hume, Enqwiry Concerning Hu.man Understamding (ed.Selby-Bigg),p. 18. 
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-the question concerning the office and function of reason or thought 
in experience. The realm of the possible, thus expanded beyond 
i1ternatives, capacities, and tendencies, to include :fictions and 
i:rnaginary creations, David Copperfield and Timothy Forsyte, 
the exploits of Jack the Giant Killer, and the adventures of Alice, 
,the pantheons and pandiablons of mythology and superstition-
• this appears to be a realm of possibles which are transcendent of 
the actual with a vengence. Yet all such entities are possible, 
. be~ause men conceive and imagine them. 
Let us explore this realm and try to see what it is that sustains 
our human interest in the possible as anything whatever which is 
i:rnaginable or conceivable. I want to show that this realm is 
genuinely objective, and that it does not constitute a world of 
essence or subsistence, separate from what exists, from nature, if 
nature means the totality of what exists. 
We are not content merely to allocate all conceivable entities, all 
possibles, to a realm separate from the world of real and actual 
existence. We have, rather, a profound interest in discovering the 
difference between two kinds of such conceivable, transcendental 
possibles. In all the typical major forms of human experience we 
have a vital and persistent concern with the difference, as we are 
likely to say, between what is really possible and what is not really 
possible. It will avoid confusion if I refrain from using the terms 
"real" and "unreal." However, the distinction here, like that be-
tween real and unreal elsewhere, is eulogistic in that it is not inde-
pendent of considerations of interest and value.We might, without 
impropriety, call the two sorts of possibles "good" and "bad." Per-
haps we can best use the terms "genuine" and "spurious." I am 
saying that this is a distinction which falls within the very wide 
universe of the possible as the barely thinkable and that there are 
two kinds of possibles, spurious and genuine. But -of course a 
spurious possibility turns out to be not really a possibility at all. 
It is an impossibility, and we reach the somewhat curious result 
that an impossibility is a certain kind of possibility. 
This is not so paradoxical as it sounds, for there is a further 
ambiguity in the meaning of "possibility," and we have to dis-
tinguish between an unrestricted and a restricted denotation of the 
possible. Only in the narrower sense does the possible coincide with 
the conceivable. In its unrestricted sense, possibility means not 
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conceivability but, as it were, anything that is a candidate fo:r 
conceivability. And not all candidates pass the test. Impossibility 
is a candidate, hence possible in the wide sense, but its candidacy 
is rejected and therefore it is impossible . .A.re round squares possi-
ble ? Yes and no. When I ask this question, I am proposing a round 
square as a candidate for the status of possibility. Round squares, 
as Alexander says, though self-contradictory and impossible, can 
nevertheless be "entertained in thought." But as soon as the idea is 
entertained and proposed, it is rejected as really inconceivable. As 
a proposal, it is a possibility: As a rejected candidate it is judged 
to be a spurious possibility, that is, an impossibility. This is a sim-
ple example. No extended process is needed to test the genuineness 
of this possibility. But mathematics is full of examples of this same 
general kind, differing only from the round square in the length 
of the interval between the proposal and the decision. Is it possible 
to square the circle or to trisect an angle with straight edge and 
compass? These questions do not answer themselves immediately. 
They have occasioned difficulty in the history of mathematics. Men 
have tried to square tl;te circle and to trisect an angle. There is a 
longer interval between the proposal of these and the decision 
which rejects them, than there is in the consideration of round 
squares. These are possible until they are shown to'. be not possible. 
But even after their spurious possibility, their impossibility, has 
been demonstrated, they still retain the status of having been can-
didates for possibility, that is, possible in the unrestricted sense. 
Round squares, circle squaring, and the like are not genuinely 
possible because they are internally discrepant and self-contradic-
tory. There is a second class of rejected possibles, another ground 
for recognizing some possible entities as spurious or impossible. 
There are possibilities (in the wide sense) which are rejected as 
spurious not because they are internally discrepant but because 
they do not accord with the known conditions of the real world, of 
the actual and the extended actual. So far as I know, there is 
nothing internally or logically contradictory in the notion of a 
perpetual motion machine. Unlike a round square, it is logically 
possible both in the unrestricted and in the narrower sense. Yet 
physicists tell us that a perpetual motion machine is not genuinely 
possible. Its impossibility arises from the fact (if it be a fact) that 
it is no possible determinant of any general determinable or set 
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of determinables which comprises the known nature of physical 
If this were all, we might hope some day to discover a set 
of general determinables of which a perpetual motion machine 
would be a determinate arrangement. Such a hope seems ground-
less in the light of our present knowledge of the general conditions 
of natural processes. 
Thus, there are two main types of spurious possibles, two 
grounds for rejecting candidates for the status of genuine possi-
' bility. Either the proposed possibility collapses immediately or 
eventually through internal contradiction, or it conflicts with some 
known general conditions of nature. What is left are genuine or 
real possibilities. The discovery of genuine possibilities and their 
discrimination from spurious possibilities is a momentous affair in 
human experience. In such discrimination and discovery lies the 
essential office of reason, of thought, of intelligence. Mind itself, 
from its very first beginnings, is elicited by the existence of real 
possibilities in the one world which is the habitat of mind. The 
intelligent direction of behavior, the resolution of problematic situ-
ations, foresight, and purposive planning, hinge upon the dis-
covery of genuine possibilities and their discrimination from 
spurious possibles. What we most need to know in the present 
economic crisis are the real possibilities resident within our exist-
ing economic and social structures. If the relevant possibilities are 
viewed as inhabiting a separate domain of subsistence, then there 
is nothing which men can do to alter and control the actual situa-
tion. How, indeed, real possibilities exist within the one world of 
nature, I have presently to consider. Before doing this, I shall deal 
briefly with two other matters. 
The discovery of genuine possibilities within our world is not 
only of supreme practical importance. What appear to be aesthetic 
and imaginative creations of poets and novelists are, in part, the 
discovery of real possibilities. What does Mr. Galsworthy do in 
creating the Forsyte family f The individual, Timothy Forsyte, 
is indeed a :fiction. His birth certificate is not recorded in Somerset 
House. Nevertheless, I think it is wholly false and misleading to 
say, as Russell does in speaking of the difference between Hamlet 
and Napoleon, 
that it is of the very essence of fiction that only the thoughts, feelings, etc. in 
Shakespeare and his readers are real, and that there is not, in addition to them, 
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an objective Hamlet. When you have taken account of all the feelings roused 
by Napoleon in writers and readers of history, you have not touched the actual 
man; but in the case of Hamlet you have come to the end of him! 
But I think it is nonsense to say that the existence of Hamlet is 
dispersed among the thoughts, feelings, and mental events of in-
numerable minds in the last three hundred and forty-four years. 
Hamlet is no more mental than was Napoleon, though Shake-
spea.re's creation of Hamlet and the reader's appreciation of him 
~ay properly be called "mental," if anything is. I agree with Stout 
in calling such literary fictions real possibilities. Timothy Forsyte 
is a real possibility because his character and actions conform to the 
real general conditions of recent English social and economic life. 
These general determinables are observed, discovered, contem-
plated, and portrayed by Mr. Galsworthy. Timothy Forsyte is an 
individual determinant of such real, general determinables. If the 
novel is true to life, there is no collision between the determinate 
individual men and events portrayed and any of the known gen-
eral conditions and variables which quite literally exist within 
some specific historical culture. Imaginative creation and invention 
here as elsewhere rest upon insight and discovery. I should go even 
farther and say that the ridiculous creations of the exuberant 
fancy of Mr. Wodehouse, or the Yankee in King A:r_thu:r's Court, 
or the incredible exploits of the creatures, of myth and fairyland, 
all rest upon some general known conditions of nature and experi-
ence. The general determinables with which they collide, which 
make them as a whole impossible, are simply left out of account. 
There is always some discoverable general feature of our world, 
some existing universal, I should say, which makes possible the 
wildest creations of imagination and fancy. In this respect they 
are all really possible. They are seen to be spurious possibles, im-
possibles, only when all the known general conditions of nature are 
taken into account. Practical experience differs from aesthetic 
experience in that it requires a consideration and knowledge of 
the entire range of relevant general conditions. 
Secondly, I would observe that the distinction between spurious 
and genuine possibles is not epistemic. This marks its radical 
difference from the distinction between the actual and an object 
of possible experience. It is our perspective, our observing or fail-
5 Russell, Mathematiaal Philosophy, p. 169. 
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to observe, upon which depends the boundary between the 
and the continuous possible. But no alteration of our per-
nothing that we can do, affects the boundary between 
and genuine possibles, between the impossible and the 
,>_,,,,.~,,,u,v- We discover what is really possible; its existence does not 
upon our knowledge. The framework of the possible is set for 
and not by us. Within that framework we act and choose, imag-
and conceive, invent and create. The question I would now ask 
What makes possible the distinction between spurious and genu-
possibles, between the impossible and the possible~ What makes 
genuine possibilities possible 1 
I shall outline my answer to this question through a brief con-
of certain types of philosophical analysis which pre-
clude any such discrimination, and therefore any discovery and 
knowledge of the genuinely possible. I am willing to make this the 
test of the adequacy of a philosophical theory : Can you show how, 
in terms of your theory, the distinction between the impossible and 
the possible-and this means the discovery of the genuinely possi-
ble-is plausible and significant 1 I say this because in the dis-
covery of the possible there is compressed pretty much the whole 
venture of mind and of human experience. 
There are two contrasted types of philosophy, both of which 
make implausible and impossible any distinction between SP.urious 
and genuine possibles. Hume and Bergson may serve as examples 
of one type, Bradley and Bosanquet as examples of the other. Ac-
cording to Hume, the contrary of any matter of fact is always 
possible. It is really possible for the fire burning in my hearth to 
congeal me instead of warming me. There is no knowledge of any 
general conditions, determinables, and structures in nature which 
precludes this as a spurious possibility. If we rule out this and its 
kind as highly improbable and guide our actions accordingly, it is 
not because of any rational or cognitive insight into the connec-
tions and relatedness of events within a system, but solely because 
of an irrational and instinctive propensity, necessary for life but 
without reasonable or theoretical warrant. Now I submit that 
where anything whatever is possible, nothing is really or genu-
inely possible. Unless there is some ground for distinguishing what 
is really possible from spurious possibilities, it is meaningless to 
say that this and not that is possible. But, as we have seen, this is 
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just what we need to know if intelligent practice is possible. The. 
search for the really possible implies the rejection of all sorts of• 
merely conceivable possibles as spurious and impossible. Is the· 
Russian economic system possible for us in America? It is con. 
ceivable; no internal contradictions need be present. Whether it 
is or is not really possible depends upon what we know about the • 
dominant scheme or structure within our economic life, and · 
whether the specific Russian plan is a determinate individual con. 
cretion of such general determinables as are actually found to exist 
in our situation. For Hume, anything whatever is possible, o:r 
(what amounts to the same thing) nothing is genuinely possible, 
because of his nominalism. He denies knowledge of anything in · 
nature except particular, actual or real, entities. He denies the ex- . 
istence of general, pervasive recurrent patterns, types, rhythms. 
For him, reason and thought do no more than provide pale replicas 
of particular impressions. They yield no insight into the general 
structure of things. 
Bergson is a Hume who takes time seriously. Like Hume, Berg-
son refuses to accord to reason and thought any theoretical insight 
into the general patterns and structures of reality. The creative 
advance of duration moves within no formal, organized structures. 
There are no known, general, relational patterns which provide the 
framework of concrete events. There is no knowledge, no cognitive 
discovery of recurrent types, forms, schemata of organization, 
within which moves the creative impulsion of nature. From each 
actual living present, there is a blind, unpredictable, forward 
thrust, a creative leap in the dark, unconstrained by any formal, 
general, intelligible structure. A mind devoted solely and purely to 
knowledge, uncontaminated by any practical necessities of acting, 
of choosing and controlling things, would be wholly absorbed in 
the actual. Unlike Hume's actual, that of Bergson is not punctual, 
atomic, and nontemporal. The present actual is a duration pene-
trated by the past which is literally carried along in and by the 
present. The entire content and wealth of the real is packed within 
the present actual and its creative advance into novelty. What is it, 
then, that leads or misleads the mind to entertain the notion of 
anything nonactual, ranging from the possible to non-being? Berg-
son tells us that all the major difficulties and problems of philoso-
phy arise from the fact that the schemata necessary for human 
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adventure beyond their proper domain. The necessities of . 
,,,,,,,..,L,,v~ and control breed concepts and habits of thought which 
into, infect, and falsify our cognitive and theoretical ap-
.,,., ,nrt:u"-'"'"V"" of reality. The requirements of practical action invoke 
imply the notion of something nonactual, of nothing, and of 
the limbo of the possible, suspended halfway between nothing and 
e:x:istence. When theoretical insight is purified and made immune 
from such contamination, nothing remains but the actual. Bergson 
true to the spirit of Positivism in this polemic against any species 
whatever of the nonactual. He differs from the scientific Positiv-
ism of Mach and Schlick, and from the positivistic wing of the neo-
Kantian movement in making the notion of the possible, the 
nonactual, spring, not from the accidental shortcomings of our 
observation and knowledge, but from the illegitimate intrusion of 
practical concepts into the domain of knowledge and intuition. 
The result is that for Bergson, as for Hume, there can be no 
discrimination between spurious possibilities and genuine possi-
bilities, that is to say, between the impossible and the possible. 
For Bergson, as for Hume, nothing is really possible because, 
viewed in the light of what we may know, anything and every-
thing are possible. For both Hume and Bergson, we possess no 
knowledge of structures, forms, recurrent schemata, relational 
systems which indubitably belong to the real no less than do 
atomic impressions or creative, present durations. A denial of such 
forms and structures is the one characteristic earmark of all de-
grees and varieties of nominalism. 
Does real possibility, distinguishable from spurious possibility 
or impossibility, fare any better in the type of philosophy repre-
sented by Bradley or Bosanquet 1 I do not think that it does. Here, 
the ground upon which real possibility is, in the end, excluded, is 
not that there are no recognizable structures and patterns in the 
world, apprehended by thought, but that ultimately there is 
nothing else. The real universal is concrete and not abstract. Possi-
bility is a species of necessity. The real absorbs the possible. Con-
crete, particular specifications and details flow from and are de-
termined by the universal which pervades them. In the concrete 
universal, the true individual, the universal is exhaustively dis-
played without remainder in the total spread of its particular 
manifestations. There can be in the Absolute no possible exempli-
22 University of California Publications in Philosophy 
fl.cations of the universal other than those which do comprise the 
actual, necessary contents and life of the .Absolute. 
Bradley has made explicit denial of the existence of the 
universal. "The abstract universal and the abstract particular are 
what does not exist ... what is real is the individual ... the ab. 
stract universal is a mental creation, not a fact outside our heads."6 
That is to say, the concept of possibility reflects only our igno1·. 
ance. It is not only not constitutive, not a bona fide metaphysical 
concept; it is not even epistemic. To characterize its status, one 
would have to invent a term which is related to "ignorance" as 
"epistemic" is related to the requirements and necessities of our 
knowledge. Bosanquet puts it without ambiguity. 
Possibility results in referring to reality, without transition, but subject to an 
estimate, what is only connected with it by transitions. When the whole transi-
tion is made explicit, the allegation of possibility is superseded. The judgment 
·which has all its conditions and reservations fully assigned to it is of the 
apodeictic order; possibility arises from effecting the reference to reality 
apart from the conditions. The idea of "possibility" is our substitute for the 
omitted conditions. Obviously, such an idea may emanate from all degrees of 
confused perception or of reflection. 7 
Now I am far from thinking that there is nothing to be said for 
the kind of thing which, in Hegelian terminology, has been named 
or rather misnamed the "concrete universal." The concrete organ-
ized structures and processes of nature, life,· and mind exhibit an 
endless variety. This variety is in part describable in terms of the 
relative looseness or compactness between the universal dominant 
scheme, the relational pattern on the one hand, and the particular 
empirical details, the factual content on the other hand. Our world 
contains both machines and symphonies, space-time patterns and 
the Platonic Form of the Good. All forms, principles of organiza-
tion, all universals are abstract, even those discoverable within the 
most concrete and individual structures. There is always, that is, 
some gap, not only for our knowledge or ignorance, but within 
nature or reality between any schemata and its empirical detail. 
The latter is always, in some measure, contingent. This is, I take it, 
the meaning of Whitehead's description of every actuality, every 
actual occasion, as a "decision." Decision is in its root meaning a 
"cutting off," an exclusion of alternative actualizations within the 
6 Bradley, Logic, I, 188. 7 Bosanquet, Logic, I, 373. 
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of the possible. Such a framework is always present. It 
no artifact, no consequence of ignorance, nor is it to be super-
at any more adequate level of knowledge. The question, What 
"-"•Tn,,_,,.c,., possibility possible? is the question, What makes it possible 
distinguish between spurious and genuine possibles, between 
impossible and the possible? In what sort of world is it possible 
discover real possibilities ? That kind of world, I ha.ve suggested, 
somewhere between the worlds of Hume and Bergson and the 
world of Bradley and Bosanquet, defined ultimately in 
_of the concrete universal. It will be a world in which there 
are types, kinds, relational structures, forms, and universals. It 
will be a world in which such general determinables have possible 
occurrences as well as actual occurrences. The existence of such 
possible occurrences is the existence of those more general struc-
tures. It will be a world whose factual details are made intelligible 
by the more general patterns and forms which they exemplify, but 
which are not deducible, without remainder, from such general 
structures. It will be a world of which the theoretical grasp and 
knowledge and practical mastery require the presence and the 
activity of ideas, of thought, and of reason. It will be a world the 
very first impact of which upon any sensitive thing or organism 
implies and entails the thought of that which transcends the im-
mediately delivered content. It will be a world in which the func-
tion of reason, implicitly present in the simplest sensory response, 
is none other than a disclosure of objective possibilities. For as 
Kemp Smith, to whom much of my discussion is greatly indebted, 
has remarked, it is "with the possible that reason, qua reason, is 
primarily concerned." 
Is such an account as this adequate to the inexhaustible range of 
objects of thought, of possibles in the unrestricted sense, including 
contradictions and the creations of fancy and imagination as well? 
Can such an account do justice to what .Alexander has described 
as the "liberty of the mind, released from the control established 
in sense by things"? This question is answered in the negative by 
all those who lodge possibilities, together with all objects of 
thought, supposition, and imagination in a separate domain of sub-
sistent nonexistence. They are made to inhabit a literal no-place, 
a utopia. With reference to all such types of subsistent realism, I 
shall limit myself to one comment. I should like to place the mo-
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tives-and they are urgent ones-which lead to such an 
of objects of thought from the actual and the real alongside of 
those motives which have led to the expulsion from nature of 
secondary qualities. It is quite clear that nature was not 
exclusively in terms of extension, of primary qualities, because 
secondary qualities had first been authenticated as mental and sub. 
jective. It was the other way around. Secondary qualities were 
voted out of nature because there was no place for them in nature 
as described and interpreted in a certain way, in terms of mecha;n. 
istic naturalism. The traditional dualism of primary and secondary 
qualities, of nature and mind, holds out now a challenge and a 
problem. Are there any equally or more adequate alternative inter. 
pretations of nature which find a legitimate place in nature for 
secondary qualities~ Perhaps the expulsion of secondary qualities 
from nature is a dodge necessitated by an attractive and relatively 
simple description. The lure of theoretical simplicity may mask 
objective complexities. Can we formulate a description of nature 
as overlapping and including secondary qualities~ I know of no 
such completely adequate description, but I think that those who 
are searching for one are on the right track. I will leave it to the 
reader to carry over the analogy from this affair of primary and 
secondary qualities to the question of the relation between the 
objects of sense experience-the actual and the continuously ex-
panded actual-and objects of thought, possibilities. Any descrip-
tion of the real, of the world of objects of actual and possible 
experience, which banishes objects of thought to a separate domain 
is, at best, a challenge. It stimulates doubt: such an interpretation 
may be altogether too simple. Transcendent possibles, alternatives, 
capacities, and tendencies, of which all the exemplifications may, 
yes, can, never be actual, are nevertheless discovered by mind, by 
thought and ideas, within the one world which comprises the 
habitat of our minds, the one inexhaustible domain of our knowing, 
our appreciation, and our doing. 
